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Comment on “Judicial Compensation
and Performance”
J.J. Prescott*

The most signiﬁcant challenges to better understanding judicial behavior are lack of data and the absence of plausible exogenous variation in judicial environments. The random assignment of judges to
cases has admittedly been helpful in gaining traction on the effects
of judicial decisions (e.g., Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang 2018). Yet developing a full empirical account of “what judges maximize” (Posner
1993) would require a setting in which judges are randomly subjected
to a wide variety of (real-world) environments with different costs,
constraints, and rewards. This prospect remains pie in the sky, but
that does not mean that we have not made some headway on the
ground. For instance, researchers have deployed the random assignment of cases to judges to back out how judges respond to differences
in case attributes when the characteristics of cases (e.g., severity) can be
assessed ex ante (Leibovitch 2016) and to attempt to gauge how judicial
decision making evolves over the course of the day or in response to an
empty stomach (Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso 2011; WeinshallMargel and Shapard 2011). These lines of research, however, have more
to say about when judges depart from the merits of cases than about which
traditional institutional features (e.g., compensation, selection) enhance judicial effort and improve accuracy.
In “Judicial Compensation and Performance,” DeAngelo and McCannon (2017) seek to make progress on the question of what judges
maximize by, ﬁrst, collecting detailed appellate data from New York
slip opinions and, second, exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in
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judicial compensation between 2007 and 2017 to better understand judicial behavior. The data assembled for the article are valuable in and
of themselves, but the idea of using a sharp discontinuity in state-level
pay to explore the role that ﬁnancial compensation plays in judicial effort and performance is also a meaningful methodological contribution. By comparing patterns in outcomes—speciﬁcally, accuracy, in
the form of decisions being “upheld”—of three sets of judges, with a focus on those judges serving before and after the shift in compensation,
the authors aim to distinguish between two theories for why the accuracy of judicial decisions might improve after a pay increase: (1) better
jurists choose to serve as judges when compensation is more generous
and/or (2) jurists simply work harder when they are better compensated. With respect to the latter possibility, the authors brieﬂy postulate an efﬁciency-wage hypothesis in which better compensated judges
choose to work harder for fear of losing their position during the next
election, but the article is largely agnostic about precisely why higher
wages might lead to better outcomes.1
DeAngelo and McCannon’s (2017) decision to approach their work
atheoretically has costs, however. Although little of their article appears to turn on the precise relationship between compensation and
effort, there are at least two ways in which their not being more explicit about the possible characteristics and fundamental nature of
this relationship has resulted in missed opportunities.
First, more theoretical precision would have allowed the authors
to distinguish between different competing theories of judicial effort
(i.e., efﬁciency wages versus reciprocity). The “shirking model” version of the efﬁciency-wage hypothesis they cite (Shapiro and Stiglitz
1984) depends on employees fearing the consequences of shirking. In
this context, low effort equates to a higher probability of being made
to leave the bench and ﬁnd employment elsewhere. The authors’ data
are from New York, a state that is geographically diverse, and therefore one that presumably presents very different employment opportunities for former judges in New York City than may be available
in Ithaca or Phoenicia. If judicial salaries are constant statewide, then
the potential loss from shirking (exogenously) varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction with this variation in outside options. If the authors
were to detect differences in outcomes that align with these different
environments, they would have a much stronger case for an efﬁciencywage hypothesis relative to other hypotheses (e.g., some versions of
reciprocity theory). One can also imagine similar empirical strategies
1
In a footnote, the authors also allow for a reciprocity theory in which judges exert
more effort following a salary increase simply to reciprocate the state’s decision to
compensate them more generously.
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taking advantage of political polarization and geographic concentration. It must be the case that many trial judges realistically face no
possibility of electoral challenge, despite needing the endorsement
of a partisan nominating convention.2
Second, more theoretical precision would have nudged the authors
to scrutinize their otherwise intuitive measure of performance—the
likelihood that a judge’s decision is upheld on appeal. An efﬁciencywage hypothesis implicitly incorporates a theory of termination and
thus an understanding of the terms and conditions of judicial positions generally. The authors recognize this, and we learn that judges
have rather long terms in New York—10 or 14 years, depending on
the court—and are generally subject to partisan elections. Assuming that
most judges expect to seek reelection, the critical question becomes,
What sort of performance is likely to generate electoral victory?3
It is not obvious—and may even run against expectations—that
avoiding reversals in criminal cases is how a judge best pursues reelection.4 For one, if avoiding reversals is truly the goal, studying criminal
appeals may be inappropriate, given the asymmetry in criminal appeal
rights. A judge can avoid reversal entirely by granting motions of acquittal for insufﬁcient evidence (which prosecutors generally cannot
appeal), and so might do this in cases with well-represented defendants to avoid reversal. This would produce a correlation between
electoral motivation and the rate at which decisions are upheld, but
that correlation would be the result of judges manipulating the composition of the appellate docket and would actually be a sign that
greater incentives lead to additional distortions rather than additional
effort. The politics of criminal justice, however, seem more likely to

2
One response to this point is that it also implies that the article’s empirical results would be even stronger if the authors categorized only judges facing heightened
incentives as receiving the treatment. The authors’ case would beneﬁt from exploring
this idea explicitly. One concern with this possibility is that the estimated effect sizes
are already quite large, which points to either extreme shirking in the preperiod or a
spurious relationship in the data.
3
Exogenous variation in the number of years until reelection and the demographic
characteristics that are themselves exogenously correlated with a judge’s likelihood of being
interested in reelection (e.g., age) are also available to probe the robustness of the efﬁciencywage hypothesis. Note that judicial terms in New York are long. The authors report
that judges are reelected on average approximately only once, hinting that a large percentage of New York judges are indifferent to their reelection chances because they are in their
second term, close to retirement, etc. Presenting data on the frequency with which judges
seek reelection and/or retire in the middle of a term would have been very useful for better
understanding judicial employment dynamics in New York.
4
DeAngelo and McCannon (2017) ought to be able to empirically assess, for instance, whether judges in New York, all else equal, are more likely to lose a bid for
reelection if they are reversed relatively more often.
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be consistent with a different dynamic. Judges are purportedly rewarded
in many places for being “tough” on criminal defendants. If true, a
judge seeking reelection might favor the prosecution more aggressively
to the point of becoming more likely to be reversed, on average. Moreover, judges might be just ﬁne with being reversed in particular cases.
An appeals court refusing to uphold a trial court’s punitive treatment
of a criminal defendant might be political gold when the district court
judge below wants to signal to the public that he or she is concerned
ﬁrst and foremost with public safety or that, unlike many “out-oftouch” judges, he or she is more interested in “the truth” than procedural niceties.5
If one accepts that there is an empirical relationship between the
sharp increase in judicial wages in New York beginning in 2012 and
judicial “effort” as measured by an increase in the likelihood a conviction is upheld, one can still proﬁtably ask how we ought to interpret such a ﬁnding. Although a sharp discontinuity in judicial wages
is more salient to all concerned, and any association with behavioral
outcomes is both easier to detect and more likely to be causal, its use
also raises a few difﬁcult questions.
First, a sharp, politics-driven, media-reported increase in judicial
wages may be endogenous to judicial behavior, perhaps a response
to declining judicial performance or quality, followed by subsequent
regression to the mean.6 Although a sharp discontinuity initially presents as an ideal situation in which to study the effects of compensation
on judicial performance, judicial salary changes that occur according
to a predetermined formula or a standardized procedure established
without reference to recent judicial behavior may allow for ﬁndings
that are more amenable to a causal interpretation.
Second, exploiting a signiﬁcant, salient, and apparently long-overdue increase in compensation raises important questions about precisely what the authors are measuring—and, ultimately, whether
the article provides valuable lessons on how to reduce judicial error.
Put another way, does DeAngelo and McCannon’s (2017) analysis teach
us about the effect of wages on judicial behavior or, instead, the effect of
a change in wages on judicial behavior? An increase in compensation,
especially a large one, is infused with many other meanings (e.g., a
showing of respect to the employee or a recognition of the employee’s
inequality aversion) that would not accompany stable wages at a higher
5
The authors could explore this idea empirically in their data by looking to see
whether appeal rates (without trial-level data, the authors would need to assume a
constant ﬂow of a cases) and reversal rates vary for trial judges over the tenure cycle.
6
DeAngelo and McCannon’s (2017) theory also suggests that we should observe an
increasing trend in reversals prior to the 2012 raise because judges’ real wages were
declining steadily (at least in relative terms) during that period.
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level many years later. A simple efﬁciency-wage hypothesis imagines
a constant effect of the higher salary over time, whereas the effect of a
change in wages would presumably diminish over time (although one
can imagine alternative theories). DeAngelo and McCannon’s ﬁgure 2
seems at odds with both theories, assuming the ﬁgure shows the timing of the trial judge’s behavior along the x-axis. The ﬁgure reveals a
slow increase over time with, at best, relatively small effects at the
outset—notwithstanding the large and salient increase in compensation at that time. One explanation might be that it takes judges time
to respond or that higher effort levels only make a difference in cases
initiated after the rise in compensation. On this latter score, it is
worth observing that judicial wages continued to increase after
2012. DeAngelo and McCannon do not use this variation in their
work, but a model of effort in which judicial compensation had to
cross some threshold, one not crossed in New York until years after
2012, might explain the patterns in their data.7
The New York slip opinions that DeAngelo and McCannon (2017)
have collected and coded for their analysis will be of considerable
value for future research. Nevertheless, the data do have important
limitations. First and foremost, the authors’ data include solely appellatelevel decisions, meaning that we cannot know how the underlying population of cases evolved over time—perhaps in reaction to policy changes,
although it seems unlikely that an increase in judicial salaries would
alter criminal behavior or prosecutorial charging decisions (unless prosecutors also experienced a contemporaneous change in compensation).8
More generally, the composition of appellate cases may have evolved
over the sample period in unobservable (or at least unobserved) ways.
Future researchers using these data would likely beneﬁt by examining
crime, arrest, charging, and trial court data in New York for compositional change. DeAngelo and McCannon do attempt to control for such
selection in their work but do so by including likely endogenous re-

7
DeAngelo and McCannon do not use the size or timing of the salary increases
(other than the timing of the ﬁrst increase) in their analysis. This makes how best
to interpret their results less obvious and seems to leave a signiﬁcant amount of useful information on the table. Thinking about how to assess a 12-year lull in salary increases and then a subsequent catch-up requires context, including an understanding
of how unusual this pattern is for state employees and whether New York judges suffered alone or with other fellow civil servants.
8
DeAngelo and McCannon also ought to have clariﬁed whether and how New
York’s appellate judges were affected by the salary increases evaluated in the article.
The outcome of interest is necessarily a function of both the trial judge’s performance
and the appellate judge’s performance. Even if appellate judges are assigned randomly
to lower-court decisions, signiﬁcant effort and selection effects at the appellate level
would alter the interpretation of the authors’ ﬁndings.
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gressors—for example, whether the case involved a trial or a guilty plea,
the number of days between judgment and appeal, and the grounds for
appeal. Given the power of trial court judges to inﬂuence these case
dimensions, they are best categorized as outcomes themselves. By controlling for them, the authors introduce potential bias into their primary estimates of interest.
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